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Political parties communicate their plans to voters via promises made during election 
campaigns. While it has been found that governments generally take these promises 
they make seriously, it has also been established that many voters believe otherwise. 
Less is known, however, about whether governments are held to account for the extent 
to which they fulfil their promises. This dissertation examines the effects of broken and 
fulfilled election pledges on voter evaluations of government performance. The findings 
challenge the idea that rewards and punishments for election pledge performance are 
straightforwardly administered by voters, instead emphasising that pledge-based ac-
countability processes are asymmetric and affected by the biases of voters. The main 
conclusion is that pledge fulfilment is not the procedural value for voters suggested 
in some classical theoretical contributions. Instead, while most voters find it important 
that election promises are not broken, they find it even more important that the decisions 
that are taken align with their own preferences. 
 
Sammanfattning på svenska 
  
Politiska partier kommunicerar sina planer till väljare genom valkampanjs löften. Me-
dan det har påvisats att regeringar i stor utsträckning tar dessa löften de gjort på allvar, 
så har det också påvisats att väljare inte uppfattar detta på samma vis. Dock vet vi 
mindre om regeringar hålls till ansvar för uppfyllelse av dessa löften. Denna avhandling 
undersöker effekterna av brutna och uppfyllda vallöften på väljarnas utvärderingar av 
regeringens prestation. Resultaten bestrider uppfattningen att belöningar och bestraff-
ningar för prestation utförs av väljarna på ett linjärt och enkelt sätt. Istället betonas att 
dessa processer är asymmetriska och påverkas av väljarnas fördomar. Den huvudsakliga 
slutsatsen är att uppfyllandet av vallöften inte är det viktigaste för väljarna, vilket går 
emot det som föreslås i vissa klassiska teoretiska bidrag. Istället, medan de flesta väljare 
tycker att det är viktigt att vallöften inte bryts, tycker de att det är ännu viktigare att de 
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Predictability is a classic virtue of government, as many classic philosophers have 
already described. Naturally, the inverse is also true – unpredictable governments 
are feared, and the stereotype of promise-breaking, lying politicians rests at the very 
core of the wide-spread political distrust that sometimes so appears to characterise 
our time. In the run up to the 2016 American presidential elections, the influential 
newspaper, the New York Post, summarised a prevalent sentiment in society with 
the following joke – ‘How do you know a politician is lying? His lips are moving’, 
in an article entitled ‘Finally, science shows that politicians are lying liars who lie’. 
Citing academic experts on lying from various disciplines such as political science 
and psychology, this article painted an unsettlingly cynical picture of office-seeking 
politicians that will promise anything to win an election and will do whatever they 
please afterward. While politicians are actually considerably more invested in ful-
filling their promises than voters commonly believe (see Thomson et al, 2017; Nau-
rin et al, 2019), we know much less about the political consequences of politicians 
keeping and breaking their promises. A central concept in influential accounts of 
representative democracy is that voters dispose of unreliable leaders through elec-
tions, but is this also a realistic threat for promise-breaking politicians? Do voters 
hold governments accountable for the promises they break?  
The aim of this dissertation is to clarify how election pledges matter to voters’ 
retrospective evaluation of government performance. The question central to the aim 
is how broken and fulfilled election pledges affect voters. One cross-sectional and 
three experimental studies, conducted in the European Union and Sweden, respec-
tively, address this universal theme as part of this thesis. The extent to which gov-
ernment performance on election pledges provides input into accountability process-
es through performance evaluations is one of the two most important ways in which 
election pledges can be theorised to matter to voters. The other is the communication 
of policy plans between political parties and voters prior to an election, to underlie 
prospective vote choices, which in itself could be an important first step in setting 
the scene for pledge-based accountability. The considerable degree of pledges that 
parties tend to fulfil suggests that parties do indeed take pledges seriously. Similarly, 
academia seems increasingly aware of this, with a growing number of studies con-
sidering election pledge performance as an indicator of government performance 
speaking to reliability and efficacy and possible grounds for informing accountabil-





tives could be formulated based on the available theoretical insights. Critics of the 
study of representative democracy will say that voters do not know which policies 
are pledged, nor which pledges are fulfilled, and they do not care either; while in 
influential accounts of representative democracy, pledges, and voter responses to 
them, take on an important role.  
Theoretical insights on this topic tend to be of a general nature – and often rely 
on a sense of ‘obviousness’ that is not always supported by empirical results. The 
theoretical contribution here lies in an elaboration of these theoretical insights, striv-
ing to add important detail and nuance to the placement of pledge performance in 
the context of wider accountability processes. The findings speak predominantly to 
two important themes. First, to the study of retrospective voting and political ac-
countability, they provide an extensive account of another form of government per-
formance on which voters may base their retrospective evaluations, rather than the 
more commonly considered criteria of economic performance or (specific) policy 
outcomes (see for overviews De Vries and Giger, 2014; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). 
Despite the relevance that important theoretical work has assigned to pledge perfor-
mance, not many empirical studies on retrospective voting have focused on pledge 
performance. To address this, a straightforward model of accountability in the form 
of a reward-punishment hypothesis was formulated and applied to the relationship 
between pledge performance and evaluations of government performance, positing 
that voters reward pledge-keepers and punish pledge-breakers. The primary results 
provided pertain to the degree to which voters do so and under which conditions. 
Second, to the study of election pledges, these results contribute empirical evidence 
that pledge performance matters to how voters hold their government accountable. 
While many studies on election pledge fulfilment have convincingly argued for the 
importance of pledge performance for accountability processes, providing empirical 
evidence for this importance has not typically been their primary focus. 
Five specific aims elaborate in more depth the details of the relationship between 
pledge performance and political accountability. First, challenging the implicit as-
sumption of symmetry in the formulated reward-punishment hypothesis, a compari-
son is made of the effects of broken and fulfilled pledges on voters’ evaluation of 
government performance. Second, challenging the implicit assumption that voters 
want all pledges to be fulfilled, the influence of pledge content on reward and pun-
ishment for fulfilled and broken pledges is assessed. Third, challenging the implicit 
assumption that voters always want pledges to be fulfilled, the role of pledge context 
and voters’ performance expectations in the effects of broken and fulfilled pledges is 
examined. Fourth, the effects of pledge performance are placed in the wider context 
of retrospective government evaluations, to determine how important broken and 
fulfilled pledges are to voters in comparison to other types of government perfor-
mance. Fifth, and finally, measurement of voter perceptions of election pledge ful-
filment is discussed focusing on the presence of an opposition-government derived 
partisan bias in forming opinions of pledge performance and the susceptibility to 
partisan cheerleading of survey questions in general. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the following sections, the concepts 
of retrospective voting, accountability, and election pledges are united and built 
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upon to formulate the central reward-punishment hypothesis. The sections after that 
discuss this hypothesis in more detail, following the specific aims set out above. 
These sections address normative aspects pertaining to pledge performance, negativ-
ity bias and asymmetry in pledge-based accountability, the influence of pledge con-
tent and context on the effects of broken and fulfilled pledges on voters, and meas-
urement of pledge fulfilment perceptions in the light of partisan bias, opposition-
government perceptual divides, and partisan cheerleading. After a summation of the 
hypotheses, the overall methodological considerations of this study are summarised. 
Finally, the results of the empirical studies are placed back into their theoretical 




























‘Voting the rascals out’ 
 
Retrospective voting entails that voters reward political actors that perform well and 
punish political actors that perform poorly (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). This reward-
punishment hypothesis, dating back to the classics (Key and Cummings, 1966; Fio-
rina, 1981), has found support in a large number of empirical studies spanning many 
different contexts (Wilkin et al, 1997; see for overviews Ashworth, 2012; Healy and 
Malhotra, 2013). As an accountability mechanism, the reward-punishment hypothe-
sis fulfils two important roles in a representative democracy. In a retributionist 
sense, elections allow voters to express their discontent with the performance of 
their government and ‘send them home’ – while well performing governments can 
be rewarded with re-election. Importantly, this can incentivise good government 
throughout the term of office (e.g., Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). In addition, elec-
tions provide voters with the possibility of extending the term of governments that 
served them well and to avoid extended exposure to governments perceived as inad-
equate or undesirable (see Downs, 1957; Malhotra and Krosnick, 2007). In that latter 
sense, retrospective evaluations can also impact prospective voting decisions (see 
e.g., Downs, 1957; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; 2013).  
The basis of retrospective voting can be dissected into two parts. Voting based 
on prior performance requires some sort of evaluation on the voters’ part of the said 
performance – before the prior performance can be used for accountability purposes. 
While ample evidence is available that voters do at least to a certain extent vote 
retrospectively (see Ashworth, 2012; Healy and Malhotra, 2013), few would argue 
that evaluations of prior performance are the sole basis for voting decisions – in 
which many other factors can play a role. That said, since voters’ retrospective eval-
uations of government performance matter to their decisions at the ballot box, it is, 
from an accountability perspective, relevant to study how evaluations are formed 
and what they are based on. 
In principle, evaluations of government performance can be based on almost 
anything. This was evidenced by the study of Healy et al (2010), which showed that 
even irrelevant events such as college basketball results can affect voters’ evalua-
tions of government performance. In practice, the predominant theme in the retro-




Many studies on economic voting have used both objective and subjective indicators 
of economic development, on societal and personal levels, to explain how voters 
form evaluations of governments’ tenure in office (see e.g., Anderson, 2007; Lewis-
Beck and Nadeau, 2011).  
However, in recent years the field of retrospective voting has started to move 
towards incorporating other grounds for government evaluations. Concrete non-
economic outcomes and performance, such as school test scores, response to natural 
disasters, and war casualties (see for an overview Healy and Malhotra, 2013:295; 
see also James and John, 2007) have been considered as input for the reward-
punishment model of retrospective voting. Other studies have examined the effects 
of policy responsiveness of the government (e.g., Canes-Wrone et al, 2002; Hogan, 
2008), corruption (e.g., Ecker et al, 2016), and the level of competency displayed 
(e.g., Fearon, 1999) on evaluations of government performance. In addition, it 
should be noted that not all policy outcomes pertain to the economy and that a wide 
range of outcomes, from the construction of a bridge to the provision of clean drink-
ing water, could be considered. A range of such non-economic policy outcomes has 
been considered in recent work (e.g., De Vries et al, 2011; Giger and Nelson, 2011; 
Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; De Vries and Giger, 2014; Gidengil and Karakoç, 2016). 
The degree to which a political actor fulfils election pledges has long not received 
similar attention in empirical retrospective voting studies (see Corrazini et al, 2014), 
but does retrospective voting based on pledge performance also occur? 
 
Election pledges and voters 
 
Election pledges occupy an important place in influential theoretical accounts of 
representative democracy (e.g., Downs, 1957; Miller and Stokes, 1963). Starting 
with the publication of the APSA report ‘Toward a more responsible two party sys-
tem’ in 1950, scholars have emphasised the importance of election pledges to repre-
sentative democracy – which has even led some to coin and utilise the term ‘promis-
sory representation’ for the most prominent form of political representation (Mans-
bridge, 2003; 2011; Rehfeld, 2009; 2011). Proponents of the mandate model of 
political representation have argued over the years that elections provide elected 
political actors with mandates from the electorate to govern as they proposed prior to 
the elections (e.g., Klingemann et al, 1994; Schedler, 1998; McDonald et al, 2004; 
Valen and Narud, 2007; Louwerse, 2011) – and election pledges find a natural, im-
portant role in these conceptions of political representation. Empirical support for 
this view has been found and is still actively growing (e.g., Hofferbert and Budge, 
1992; Louwerse, 2011; Thomson et al, 2017; Kolpinskaya et al, 2020; Naurin et al, 
2019). There is also empirical evidence that election pledges matter prospectively to 
voters – making the right pledges can attract voters (Elinder et al, 2015; Born et al, 
2018)1.  
                                                                
1 See also studies on the effects of election campaigns on voters (e.g., Finkel, 1993; Druckman, 2004). 
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From an accountability perspective, what matters is the degree to which leaders 
honour their commitments and provide the policies that they promised to implement 
(pledge performance). The way Downs (1957) saw it, if political actors are inherent-
ly office-seekers, and voters are policy-seekers, pledges should serve two important 
functions. First, pledges reveal important information on the policy plans of the 
political actor making them, therewith allowing voters to select the candidate that 
will provide the policies they seek. This allows political actors to seek office by 
promising those voters the appropriate policies. Second, political actors need to fulfil 
their pledges if they want to win re-election from voters responding to implemented 
policies. Otherwise, they risk losing re-election from voters seeking to obtain their 
desired policies from political actors that either have delivered or provide a more 
credible promise of delivering such policies in the subsequent governing term (see 
also Stokes, 2001 and Erikson et al, 2002) – a prospective implication of retrospec-
tive voting. Pledge performance tells voters about the integrity and honesty of politi-
cal parties, as well as about their competence and decision-making capacity (Naurin, 
2011). From this perspective, punishing pledge-breakers is not merely punitive or an 
incentive for parties to fulfil their pledges. Not re-electing dishonest and incompe-
tent parties also serves the voters in their desire for an honest and competent gov-
ernment that delivers (a similar prospective component of retrospective voting to 
that described in accounts of economic voting; see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 
2000). 
While an important role of pledge performance in accountability processes could 
be presumed, not many studies have empirically addressed the importance of elec-
tion pledges to voters (see also Corazzini et al, 2014; Matthieβ, 2020). Rather, most 
empirical studies on election pledges have focused on the degree to which pledges 
are fulfilled. A consistent finding is that while political parties have been found to 
take their pledges seriously – and generally act on most of them – voters generally 
do not believe this to be true (Naurin, 2011; Thomson, 2011; Thomson and Bran-
denburg, 2019; see for overviews Thomson et al, 2017; Naurin et al, 2019). Another 
question that has received attention recently is to what degree voters are aware of 
which pledges are made, and which ones are fulfilled – and why (Naurin and Os-
carsson, 2017; Pétry and Duval, 2017; Thomson and Brandenburg, 2019; see also 
Thomson, 2011).  
Over recent years, the number of empirical studies explicitly addressing the role 
of pledge performance in accountability processes has grown. In laboratory experi-
ments, punishment and reward for broken and fulfilled election pledges have been 
convincingly established (Corazzini et al, 2014; Born et al, 2018). Johnson and Ryu 
(2010) found support in Latin American politics for broken pledges functioning as a 
magnifier of economic performance. On the macro-level, the analysis of Matthieß 
(2020) on data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that government parties that 
fulfil more pledges present better results in subsequent elections. In addition, results 
from studying the effects of post-election policy shifts in 23 countries over 40 years 
imply conditional electoral punishment for broken election pledges (Tavits, 2007).  




retrospective voting based on pledge performance – rather highlighting the im-
portant prospective effects of pledges on voting behaviour. 
The main take-away is that even if pledge performance matters to voters’ evalua-
tions of government performance, the central reward-punishment hypothesis may 
not address the relationship in sufficient detail for all intents and purposes. More 
closely examined, the basic hypothesis of pledge-based accountability, that approval 
of pledge-breaking parties will be lower than that of pledge-fulfilling parties, relies 
on a number of assumptions that need to be addressed. In its most basic form, this 
hypothesis would pre-suppose that voters are aware of which pledges are made, 
fulfilled, and broken – and are correct in their assessment (i); that the mechanism 
applies equally to any combination of political actor and voter (ii); that all voters see 
fulfilled pledges as good performance and broken pledges as poor performance (iii); 
that voters want all pledges to be fulfilled, irrespective of what was promised (iv); 
and that voters expect all pledges to be fulfilled, irrespective of circumstances (v). In 
other words, the specific hypotheses for the empirical part need to at least account 
for the following five nuances – voter awareness; partisanship; normative voter 
expectations of pledge fulfilment; pledge content and its consistency with voter 
preferences; and pledge context – surrounding factors that may alter voters’ perfor-
mance expectations.  
Work on economic voting provides further support for these notions. Indeed, for 
voters to base their retrospective evaluations of government performance on eco-
nomic indicators – they need to be aware of them (e.g., Gomez and Wilson, 2001; 
Duch and Stevenson, 2008; see also Healy and Malhotra, 2013). In addition, voters 
need to agree with definitions of good and bad performance (e.g., Tilley and Hobolt, 
2011). Economic voting studies also reference unequal responses to negative and 
positive economic performance (e.g., Bloom and Price, 1975; Hansen et al, 2015; 
Kappe, 2018); partisan bias in evaluating economic performance (e.g., Rudolph, 
2006; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; see also Healy and Malhotra, 2013); and contextual 
factors that may condition the economic vote (e.g., Rudolph, 2006; Duch and Ste-
venson, 2008; Singer and Carlin, 2013) – also with respect to voters’ expectations of 
(economic) government performance (Palmer and Whitten, 1999; Malhotra and 
Margalit, 2014). 
 
Voter perceptions of pledge fulfilment 
 
As a somewhat pragmatic concern, for pledge performance to matter to voters, vot-
ers need to some degree to be aware of what pledges are made, by whom, and what 
their fulfilment status is. While academic definitions of what constitutes a pledge are 
clear and have received a lot of attention (see Thomson et al, 2017; Naurin et al, 
2019) – it is also known that voters have different and broader definitions of what 
constitutes a pledge (Naurin, 2011; Thomson, 2011; Dupont et al, 2019). This in part 
explains why voters’ perceptions of pledge fulfilment in general do not correspond 
to the positive academic findings of pledge fulfilment by government parties. In 
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addition, voter myopia, misinformation, and political disinterest could be expected 
to affect voter awareness of election pledges and the degree to which they are ful-
filled (e.g., Carrubba, 2001; Hellwig and Marinova, 2015). 
However, studies that have addressed the extent to which voters are aware of in-
dividual pledges and their fulfilment status have found evidence of voter awareness. 
Naurin and Oscarsson (2017) found that Swedish voters are quite able to assess 
whether specific pledges have been fulfilled (see also Thomson, 2011), more so if 
they possess higher levels of political knowledge. Personal heuristics were found to 
play a lesser role in the degree to which voters are correct about the fulfilment of 
specific election pledges. Pétry and Duval (2017) presented similar findings, reserv-
ing a more important role for heuristics and motivated reasoning; and a slightly 
different role for political knowledge. They found voters’ political knowledge to 
matter to fulfilment evaluations of fulfilled pledges but not to fulfilment evaluations 
of unfulfilled pledges. Thomson and Brandenburg (2019) found that voters’ trust 
affects the accuracy of their fulfilment evaluations, and the extent to which they rely 
on heuristic thinking. Overall, voters are quite able to assess whether a given pledge 
has been fulfilled or not – but some biases may impact the accuracy of their fulfil-
ment evaluations.  
Other accounts of retrospective voting have found that attribution of reward and 
blame is affected by partisan bias (e.g., Rudolph, 2006; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; see 
also Healy and Malhotra, 2013). Therefore, when it comes to assigning broken and 
fulfilled pledges to parties, partisan preferences can also be expected to play a role. 
It is reasonable to assume that voters are less inclined to assign pledges known to 
have been broken to the parties they support and more inclined to credit them with 
fulfilled pledges. This may also impact the accuracy of voter assessments of pledge 
fulfilment status – with voters more likely to view pledges made by preferred parties 
as fulfilled and more likely to view pledges made by non-preferred parties as bro-
ken. Recent findings in Portugal (Belchior, 2019) further support this notion. For 
voters’ general assessment of the extent to which pledges are fulfilled, some indica-
tions of such partisan bias have been observed. Indeed, comparing data from two 
different waves of the Swedish national SOM survey (2000; 2012) on voters’ pledge 
fulfilment perceptions for all Swedish parties (Markwat, 2015) suggests that voters 
reason from a government vs. opposition perspective when assessing pledge fulfil-
ment. An important implication of this would be that excluding party labels from the 
equation does not fully immunise the measurement of pledge fulfilment perceptions 
against partisan bias. This notion resonates with previous research – that even non-
partisan questions can incite partisan behaviour (e.g., Chia et al, 2007; Feldman, 
2011). This entails that when voters are asked to assess the extent to which political 
actors in general fulfil their pledges,the answers provided are not just impacted by 
potential voter unawareness and different definitions on the voters’ part (Naurin, 
2011; Thomson, 2011; Dupont et al, 2019). Different voters may have a different 
subset of parties in mind and may treat the question as a means to express their like 
or dislike for this subset of parties. In which case, both often-used measures of vot-
ers’ general pledge fulfilment perceptions, that is, including and excluding partisan 




more positively to survey questions when their preferred party is in government, 
even if the survey question does not ask them to assess a topic related to national, 
partisan politics. This partisan cheerleading theory hypothesis is tested in paper 4, 
the results of which provide strong support for the occurrence of partisan cheerlead-
ing to the vast majority of survey questions in a political survey. 
In summary, not everything points to a strong influence of partisan bias. Despite 
the empirical indications mentioned above, that partisan heuristics  to a large degree 
drive voters’ general assessment of the extent of pledge fulfilment (Markwat, 2015), 
recent empirical studies addressing more specific voter assessments of the fulfilment 
of individual pledges indicate considerable levels of voter awareness (Naurin and 
Oscarsson, 2017; Pétry and Duval, 2017; Thomson and Brandenburg, 2019). In 
addition, if voters are confronted with concise messages about election pledges, their 
fulfilment status, and the political actor responsible – the problems of voter una-
wareness and partisan bias for the accuracy of voter assessment of pledge fulfilment 
would arguably be of lesser importance to the mechanism of pledge-based accounta-
bility. To that point, it is known that the media report on the pledges that are made 
and the degree to which governments manage to uphold them (Krukones, 1984; 
Costello and Thomson, 2008; Kostadinova, 2017), and that these reports can be 
quite explicit.2 
That said, partisan bias can also impact how voters respond to pledge perfor-
mance. If voters are less likely to punish preferred parties and more likely to punish 
non-preferred parties for poor performance (see e.g., Fiorina, 1981; Lebo and Cassi-
no, 2007; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011) – voter responses to fulfilled and broken pledges 
can be expected to depend on the level of affinity between the voter and the pledge-
maker. This effect can stem either from disbelief on the voter’s part that their pre-
ferred party would break a pledge or that a non-preferred party would fulfil a pledge; 
as from an unwillingness to punish a party that the voter feels sympathy for or to 
reward a party that the voter dislikes (see Fiorina, 1981). This warrants the hypothe-
sis that broken pledges are more likely to lead opposition supporters to more nega-
tive evaluations of government performance than government supporters, and vice 
versa. The influence of partisanship on rewards and punishments for broken and 
fulfilled pledges is tested in paper 1. While partisanship has a strong direct effect on 
voters’ evaluations of government performance – partisanship – as such – was not 




                                                                
2 For example, article headers found during the study period have included: ‘[The Liberals] honor their 
election promise on teaching assistants’ (SVT - Swedish National Broadcaster); ‘The Social Democrats 
promise an extra week of parental leave’ (Aftonbladet); and ‘The Alliance breaks election promise: 
sneakily raised petrol excise’ (Aftonbladet). 
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Good and poor performance 
 
For any hypothesis indicating that voters are affected by performance, it is important 
to establish what voters perceive to be good and poor performance. While the com-
mon conception is that broken pledges count as poor performance and fulfilled 
pledges constitute good performance – certain caveats can be identified. Is it truly 
without question that broken pledges are always a sign of poor performance and 
fulfilled pledges are a sign of good performance? While the pejorative accusation of 
‘promise-breaker’ often thrown around in political debates (see Esaiasson and 
Håkansson, 2002; see also Benoit, 2013) carries an unmistakably negative connota-
tion, conditions can be envisioned under which breaking a pledge may be perceived 
as favourable by voters (see e.g., Schedler, 1998; Stokes, 2001).  
Arguably, the way in which prior performance, including pledge performance, 
matters most to voters, is related to voters’ representational preferences (e.g., Car-
man, 2007; Werner, 2019), or as Schedler (1998) argued on the question of whether 
election pledges should be fulfilled: in the end, it is up to the voters. In the model of 
mandate representation, pledges are commonly allotted a prominent role. From this 
perspective, if the mandates that political actors receive from their electorate during 
elections are clear,3 violating them would constitute a violation of the voters’ trust in 
the political actor. Reasoning from an accountability perspective of representation, 
broken pledges can affect voters’ views of political actors’ competency and reliabil-
ity. An extension of these perspectives would suggest consequences for the political 
actor’s prospects of re-election if pledges are broken.  
However, central to the idea of representational preferences is the notion that 
various models of representational preferences imply that various levels of discre-
tionary freedom are available to representatives (see e.g., Pitkin, 1967; Fox and 
Shotts, 2009; Bengtsson and Wass, 2010). From this perspective, it can be presumed 
that voters may have different desires when it comes to the fulfilment of election 
pledges. If voters impose strict demands on their representatives and expect the 
representatives to act according to the voters’ desires – not implementing the poli-
cies that were implicitly agreed upon before the election should be seen as poor 
performance. However, if voters entrust representatives with their effective power to 
govern by electing them and allow representatives to serve the voters’ interests the 
way they see fit – a certain degree of discretionary freedom should be expected for 
the representatives to break at least certain pledges under certain conditions. Indeed, 
from that latter perspective, punishment for broken pledges could be substantially 
less probable. Recent empirical studies confirm this notion, finding that voters actu-
ally have different representational preferences – and that while some prefer repre-
sentatives to always fulfil their pledges, others prioritise enactment of the common 
good or responsiveness to public opinion (Werner, 2019). 
                                                                
3 Which they are not necessarily (see Pennock, 1979; Riker, 1982; Kelley, 1983; Powell, 2000; McDonald 




Whether a trust or mandate is violated could be considered a matter of subjective 
interpretation on the voter’s part. Indeed, if the voter supports that the promised 
policy action is not enforced, it would be hard to argue that that voter feels the polit-
ical actor in question deserves punishment. Those vehemently opposed to Donald 
Trump building a wall on the Mexican border will have hoped he did not fulfil his 
promise. Following the same logic, if breaking the pledge is considered good per-
formance – for whatever reason it may be – then this should not tarnish the voter’s 
confidence in that actor’s capacity to perform in the future either. In fact, the antici-
pated effect might be quite the opposite in such cases. 
Three survey items were developed and fielded in the Swedish national SOM-
survey of 2017, exclusively for this thesis, to provide essential empirical background 
information on voters’ representational preferences in the context of political par-
ties’ pledge fulfilment. These survey items were presented to a representative sam-
ple of the Swedish population (1,755 respondents). On a scale from 1-5, where 1 is 
‘fully disagree’ and 5 is ‘fully agree’, respondents were asked to which extent they 
agreed with the following statements: ‘Parties are better suited than voters to assess 
which election promises should be kept’ (i); ‘Parties’ election promises represent 
contracts that should never be broken’ (ii); and ‘Parties should always be held ac-
countable for broken election promises’ (iii). 
As anticipated, the results indicate that representational preferences vary among 
voters (see also Carman, 2007; Von Schoultz and Wass, 2017; Werner, 2019). While 
for all statements, the largest share of respondents indicated ‘low discretionary free-
dom’ for their representational preferences of pledge fulfilment, for two out of three 
statements there is a substantial minority sympathising with ‘high discretionary 
freedom’ representation as well. The only exception is the statement that political 
parties should always be held accountable for the pledges they break, which got an 
overwhelming support of 65% of the respondents that answered the question – while 
only 12% disagrees to some extent. An OLS regression analysis revealed that while 
varying representational preferences with regard to discretionary freedom are found 
across Swedish society, politically interested voters were slightly more likely to allot 
the government more discretionary freedom. 
On the one hand, the views of the respondents on whether parties should be held 
accountable for breaking their pledges corresponds largely to the observation that 
the general norm that political parties should fulfil their pledges is quite uncontro-
versial (Schedler, 1998). At the same time, the variation that was found for the per-
ceptions that pledges are contracts that should not be broken; and that  political par-
ties are better suited than voters to assess which pledges should and should not be 
fulfilled, implies that different voters may have different representational desires. In 
that case, it is arguably overly simplistic for the reward-punishment hypothesis to 
assume broken pledges are perceived by all voters as poor performance and fulfilled 
pledges as good performance. 
In addition, it should be restated here that pledge performance is not the only 
form of government performance voters might consider in their retrospective gov-
ernment evaluation. A number of valid performance indicators that voters can use as 
shortcuts to evaluate government performance can be thought of (see also Healy and 
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Malhotra, 2013) but their relative importance to voters does not appear to have been 
systematically studied (see Werner, 2019). If voters have different desires of politi-
cal representation (Carman, 2007; Von Schoultz and Wass, 2017; Werner, 2019), it 
can be presumed that different forms of government performance are of differing 
importance to different voters. Indeed, for voters expecting political actors to act 
(almost) exactly according to the voters’ desires, it would make sense that more 
weight is attached to the congruence of the policies implemented with their policy 
preferences and policies pledged prior to the election. Conversely, for voters that 
expect their representatives to act with a higher degree of discretionary freedom, 
policy and economic outcomes would more likely serve as the primary evaluation 
criteria.  
For the effects of pledge performance on evaluations of government perfor-
mance, this implies that other modes of government performance moderate these 
effects. For example, if the economy is doing well, and/or favourable policy out-
comes are obtained, and/or the produced public policy is in line with public opinion 
or voter preferences – broken pledges are expected to induce in voters lesser effects 
on the perceived credibility and, especially, decision-making capacity and compe-
tency of a political actor. This in turn means that voters can then be expected to 
attach less weight to a political actor breaking the pledges they made to the elec-
torate. The hypothesis is that the effect of broken pledges on voter evaluations of 
government performance is weaker when other aspects of government performance 
are perceived as more positive, and vice versa. Paper 3 evaluates the relative im-
portance of pledge performance for voters. It found a clear contribution of pledge 
performance to overall voter evaluations of government performance. However, the 
contributions of both a government’s policy congruence with voters and obtained 
economic outcomes were found to be substantially larger. 
 
Pledge content and policy consistency 
 
The content of election pledges constitutes another important complication for the 
perception of fulfilled pledges as good performance and broken pledges as poor 
performance. If voters are policy-seekers (Downs, 1957), then they should not re-
ward political actors that implement undesirable policies. Applied to pledge perfor-
mance, this entails that fulfilled pledges should be perceived as good performance 
only by those that support the policy action contained in that pledge. Vice versa, 
voters that perceive the policy action contained in a pledge as undesirable should 
probably not consider the breaking of that pledge poor performance. Indeed, the 
breaking of that pledge would then serve the policy agenda of those voters. In these 
cases, the voter could still punish the political actor for breaking an implied trust by 
going back on their word, but the perception of their future capacity and competency 





A large body of literature exists that deals with the question as to which degree vot-
ers’ policy preferences correspond to the policy positions of their representatives – 
and the degree to which this issue congruence is supposed to matter (e.g., Thomas-
sen and Schmitt, 1999; Mattila and Raunio, 2006; Golder and Stramski, 2010; Ar-
nold and Franklin, 2012; Dassonneville et al., 2020; see also Esaiasson & Holmberg, 
2017; Perreira, 2020). In addition to studies on the prospective effects of election 
campaigns and pledges (Finkel, 1993; Druckman, 2004; Elinder et al, 2015; Born et 
al, 2018), there are studies on issue voting in general (e.g., Bartels, 1986; An-
solabehere et al, 2008) – affirming to a degree that policy positions and policy pref-
erences should matter to voters. Of particular interest is the study by Fournier et al 
(2003), focusing on the mediating influence of issue importance on the effect of 
policy issues on voting behaviour. Their findings entail that when voters consider an 
issue important enough – because they support either side of the cause to a large 
degree – it will impact how voters use policy to make electoral decisions. In con-
junction with the findings in the field of issue voting, this implies that voters actual-
ly find policy issues important enough to consider them when assessing government 
performance and even when holding parties accountable in elections. 
Of course, voters do not construct policy preferences and issue positions free 
from outside interference. Indeed, both the media and prominent political actors 
have been found to drive, to a large degree, what voters think they want their gov-
ernment to do (e.g., Jordan, 1993; Kleijnenhuis and Rietberg, 1995). As for policy 
preferences in general, the assessment of the policy content of an election pledge is 
therewith almost inevitably a complex combination of attachment to the pledge-
making actor (i.e., partisan bias), ideological features, as well as a range of biases, 
and sociotropic or egotropic interest in the issue at hand (e.g., O’Rourke and Sinnott, 
2006; Walgrave and Lefevere, 2013). The well-documented partisan bias in political 
attitudes and behaviour (e.g., Bartels, 2002; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011) prescribes that 
voters should be more inclined to like the policy proposals made by their preferred 
party, even if the congruence between their preferences and the proposal is not op-
timal (Carsey and Layman, 2006). With respect to the content of election pledges, 
this would imply that voters would put higher demands on the pledge performance 
of their preferred parties, as they are more likely to want the policy proposed by 
them to actually be implemented. However, as hypothesised earlier, it is entirely 
possible that the same partisan bias underlying that mechanism also moderates the 
punishments awarded to parties for breaking election pledges; additionally, it has a 
direct, positive impact on the overall evaluation of the said parties’ performance.4  
Considering the above, it can be hypothesised that fulfilled election pledges are 
less likely to positively affect voter evaluations of government performance if the 
proposed policy action in the pledge does not correspond to voter preferences, and 
vice versa. The importance of pledge content for voter responses to fulfilled and 
broken election pledges is evaluated in paper 1. The affinity of a voter with the 
content of a pledge has an important impact on fulfilled pledges. Fulfilling a pledge 
                                                                
4 Paper 1 found no evidence for the former but clear evidence for the latter. 
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containing policy action inconsistent with a voter’s preferences was found to have a 
negative effect on that voter’s evaluation of government performance. 
 
Pledge context and performance expectations 
 
Not just the content of election pledges has the potential to affect how pledge per-
formance impacts voter evaluations of government performance. A number of con-
textual factors can be specified as well that should create, lower, or increase voter 
expectations of pledge fulfilment – which in turn could cushion the blow in the case 
of broken pledges, as well as increase the rewards when pledges are fulfilled against 
all odds. For example, if economic conditions are evidently poor, voters may have 
more understanding for a political actor being unable to allocate the necessary budg-
et to implement a pledged policy change. Similarly, demands may be higher on a 
party governing on a single party majority, than one engaged in a complex, or mi-
nority coalition government. 
While few studies have addressed the role of performance expectations in ac-
countability processes and retrospective voting, large bodies of literature on similar 
topics have been built up in other academic fields over the years. When Richard L. 
Oliver (1977; 1980) documented the expectation confirmation theory (ECT) in the 
late 1970s,5 its main focus lay on consumers evaluating the performance of private 
goods, and – later – services. Consequently, the academic disciplines that took a first 
interest in testing the theory of expectation confirmation were marketing, retailing, 
and economics, in addition to psychology. The rationale of the theory was that when 
the performance of a consumer good exceeded the consumer’s expectation, this led 
to a higher level of customer satisfaction with the product and its supplier – whereas 
products failing to meet the consumer’s expectation were associated with lower 
levels of customer satisfaction. In addition to studies emphasising the importance of 
the ECT in evaluations of consumer goods (e.g., Swan and Combs, 1976), the role 
of expectation disconfirmation has also been established in evaluations of private 
services (e.g., Cadotte et al, 1987; Tse and Wilson, 1988).  
In more recent years, the ECT has also appeared in studies interested in citizen 
evaluations of public goods and services, in the field of public administration (e.g., 
Chandek and Porter, 1998; James, 2009; Morgeson, 2013). These studies used the 
expectation confirmation theory – often referred to as Expectancy Disconfirmation 
Models (EDM) in public administration research – to study how citizens evaluate 
the services provided by their (local) administrations. In addition to, and in line with 
this, studies on specific public service providers and local governments, Morgeson 
(2013), found support for the ECT in the formation of citizen attitudes toward feder-
al government services in the US as well. 
                                                                
5 But note that parallels can be observed with the work on ‘rising expectations’ in sociological studies 
relating the concept of relative deprivation to the arising of, and participation in, social movements in the 




Despite its success and popularity in other fields, the ECT – and performance expec-
tations in general – have not taken a prominent role in many political science stud-
ies. That said, some overlap can be found between the roots of the ECT and early 
contributions on the ‘honeymoon effect’ (Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 1976), as well as 
the concept of benchmarking in retrospective voting (e.g., Kayser and Peress, 2012; 
Arel-Bundock et al, 2019; see also Healy and Malhotra, 2013)6. In addition, a small 
number of studies have underlined the importance of the expectation confirmation 
theory to the understanding of political attitude formation and political behaviour 
(Jenkins-Smith et al, 2005; Kimball and Paterson, 1997; Malhotra and Margalit, 
2014; Waterman et al, 1999; 2014).  
On the other hand, Seyd (2015) – combining survey data from the UK on re-
spondents’ prior, existing expectations regarding politicians’ performance, actual 
performance, and respondent levels of political trust – concluded that lower expecta-
tions do not lead to a milder response to poor government performance, and that 
governments seeking to increase political trust should rather aim for better perfor-
mance than for lower expectations. Nevertheless, Malhotra and Margalit (2014) – 
using vignette experimental treatments, including information to respectively raise 
or lower voters’ expectations of government performance, and information to re-
spectively confirm or disconfirm these manipulated expectations – concluded that 
voters punished their leaders for underperformance when they felt that the govern-
ment could be held responsible for this poor performance. However, if such attribut-
able authority was lacking, voters were found to reward leaders for setting high 
expectations, irrespective of the results, leading Malhotra and Margalit (2014) to 
conclude that in general, optimism is rewarded by voters as a character trait.7 
In addition, frequently cited accounts of retrospective voting (e.g., Fiorina, 1981) 
have touched upon a mechanism in which voters’ prior experience affects their ex-
pectations of future performance, and therewith their perception of that performance 
(see Erikson et al, 2002). Recent empirical findings have also underlined that per-
formance expectations are formed by voters, and that these are to an extent the prod-
uct of external factors (Kolpinskaya et al, 2020) – implying they can be manipulated. 
This was also shown to be true for expectations of pledge fulfilment, which can, at 
least, be altered by certain rhetoric – or ‘persuasive words’ (Lindgren, 2017).  
In the Swedish national SOM-survey of 2016, a survey question exclusively de-
veloped for the purposes of this thesis was posed to a representative sample of the 
Swedish population. The question contained five election pledges – three of which 
were made by the Social Democrats and two by the Green Party – which together 
formed the Swedish government at the time. On a scale of 1-4, where 1 is ‘very 
improbable’ and 4 is ‘very probable’, the respondents were asked how probable they 
found it that each of these pledges would be fulfilled.  
                                                                
6 An interesting comparison of the electoral effects of expected and unexpected economic change is also 
provided by Palmer and Whitten (1999). 
7 Indeed, a surprising finding in the light of the well-established negativity bias in political impressions, 
attitudes, and behaviour. 
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The results illustrate that there is indeed variation in voter performance expectations 
of pledge performance. Not only do the expectations vary per voter, but they also 
vary substantially by pledge and by political party responsible for making the 
pledge. The perceptions of the respondents are generally negative, in line with the 
findings on general pledge fulfilment perceptions (Belchior, 2019). However, the 
respondents are a lot more optimistic about the pledges made by the Social Demo-
crats than those made by the Green Party. Of one Social Democrat pledge (to make 
pre-schools mandatory for 6-year olds), a narrow majority even has high fulfilment 
expectations. Analysis performed on the same data revealed that while expectations 
are generally low, they are somewhat higher among supporters of, and those re-
spondents that consider themselves ideologically closer to, the party that made them. 
This partly explains the higher average expectations reported for pledges made by 
the much larger Social Democrats than for the much smaller Green Party.  
It is to be expected that rewards and punishments for fulfilled and broken elec-
tion pledges are conditional upon the fulfilment expectations that a voter may have. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is that broken election pledges are more likely to negative-
ly affect voter evaluations of government performance if voter fulfilment expecta-
tions of pledges are higher, and vice versa. Concretely, this means that voters with 
high expectations are more likely to be disappointed in a government party that 
breaks its election pledges and thus more likely to lower their approval of this par-
ty’s performance – i.e., administer more severe political punishment (negative dis-
confirmation / underperformance hypothesis). Vice versa, voters with low expecta-
tions are presumed to be more positively surprised by a government party fulfilling 
their election pledges and therefore to increase their approval of this party’s perfor-
mance – i.e., administer higher political reward (positive disconfirmation / outper-
formance hypothesis). The importance of pledge context and voter fulfilment expec-
tations is addressed in paper 2. The findings did not support the hypothesised dis-
confirmation effects – but rather suggested the presence of a confirmation bias. 
 
Negativity bias: asymmetric accountability 
 
From any reward-punishment hypothesis, the implicit assumption could be extracted 
that rewards and punishments for good and poor behaviour are supposed to be equal. 
However, it is well-documented that voters have a tendency to process negative 
information differently from positive information (see for an overview Soroka, 
2014) and to attach more weight to negative than to positive information. There are 
many cognitive biases that guide human psychology and behaviour – and it is well-
established that the political realm is far from an exception to this rule (e.g., Kunda, 
1990; Zaller, 1992; Arceneaux, 2012; Huber et al, 2012). Negativity bias is a promi-
nent example of this. In psychology, it entails that negative information affects a 
person’s psyche more strongly than neutral or positive things. The general focus of 
psychological research on negativity biases has been on impression and attitude 




the same applies to early contributions in political science (e.g., Lau, 1982). Nega-
tivity effects were also found in the study of political leaders (e.g., Lau, 1985; Klein, 
1991; Goren, 2007). Overall, in politics, negativity biases have been found to be 
relevant for, among other things, reactions to news, political campaigns, and in rat-
ings of elected officials (see Soroka, 2014).  
An asymmetry between rewards and punishments in accountability processes has 
also long been suggested – starting with the classic contributions by Campbell et al 
(1960) and Key and Cummings (1966), asserting that electoral punishment should 
be more probable than reward. In empirical economic voting studies, support for 
such an asymmetry has not been consistently found (see for an overview Radcliffe, 
1994). Nevertheless, several studies on economic voting have underlined unequal 
voter responses to poor and good economic conditions (e.g., Bloom and Price, 1975; 
Claggett, 1986; Hansen et al, 2015; Kappe, 2018). In addition, strong support was 
found for the existence of an asymmetry in the way voters hold local officials ac-
countable in England (James and John, 2007; Boyne et al, 2009).  
If indeed negative information is to have a stronger effect on voters than positive 
information, and voters hold governments accountable in an asymmetric way, this 
implies that broken pledges should matter more to voters’ evaluations of government 
performance than fulfilled pledges. Since voters hold parties’ pledge performance in 
a particularly low regard, it is plausible that a negativity bias exists in the way voters 
respond to information about election pledges – and probably also about pledge 
performance. It is hypothesised that broken pledges have a stronger effect on voter 
evaluations of government performance than do fulfilled pledges. This hypothesis is 
tested in paper 1 – which findings confirm the existence of a negativity bias in 
pledge performance effects on voter evaluations of government performance. The 
existence of this asymmetry in pledge-based accountability – punishment for broken 
pledges, but virtually no reward for fulfilled pledges8 – further provides an important 
explanation for why government approval has been found to almost inevitably de-
crease over time – the well-documented ‘cost of ruling’ (see e.g., Paldam, 1986; 





To sum up, the aim of this thesis is to clarify how election pledges matter to voters’ 
retrospective evaluation of government performance – and for that purpose seven 
hypotheses were developed. The overarching hypothesis is the reward-punishment 
hypothesis central to retrospective voting, adapted to the context of pledge perfor-
mance (H1). Its central rationale is that voters reward for fulfilled pledges and pun-
ish for broken pledges – where rewards and punishments are observed in voters’ 
evaluations of government performance. The validity of this hypothesis finds con-
                                                                
8 If the pledge content is incongruent with voter preferences, punishments may even be observed for 
fulfilled pledges – see paper 1. 
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siderable support in theoretical elaborations of the role of pledge performance in a 
representative democracy (see for an overview Naurin et al, 2019) and, to a degree, 
also in contemporary empirical studies (Johnson and Ryu, 2010; Corrazini et al, 
2014; Born et al, 2018; Matthieß, 2020).  
H1: A political actor breaking an election pledge leads voters to more negatively 
evaluate this actor’s performance, whereas a political actor fulfilling an election 
pledge leads voters to more positively evaluate this actor’s performance in govern-
ment. 
Based on insights from work on partisan cheerleading and opposition-
government divides and partisan bias, it is theorised that voters’ perceptions of gen-
eral pledge performance are affected by partisan bias, which can be incited even 
without explicit partisan references. The partisan cheerleading hypothesis (H2) 
pertaining to this notion is studied in paper 4 and is formulated as follows: 
H2: Voters provide more negative responses to survey questions when a political 
actor that the voter does not support is in government, and more positive responses 
when a political actor that the voter supports is in government. 
In addition, borrowing from work on partisanship and partisan bias, it is theo-
rised that partisan bias moderates the effects of broken and fulfilled election pledges 
on voter evaluations of government performance. More specifically, it is expected 
that voters are less likely to punish preferred parties and less likely to reward non-
preferred parties. This partisan bias hypothesis (H3) is addressed empirically in 
paper 1 and formulated as follows: 
H3: A broken pledge leads voters to more negative performance evaluations of a 
political actor, if it was made by a political actor that the voter does not support, 
whereas a fulfilled pledge leads voters to more positive performance evaluations of 
a political actor, if it was made by a political actor that the voter supports. 
Evaluating the notion that voters perceive broken pledges to constitute poor per-
formance and fulfilled pledges to constitute good performance – the existence of 
varying representational preferences in voters is used to theorise that voters general-
ly find it important that pledges are fulfilled but are typically more concerned with 
delivered economic outcomes. The accompanying relative importance hypothesis 
(H4) is addressed in paper 3 and formulated as follows: 
H4: The effect of a broken election pledge on voter evaluations of a political ac-
tor’s performance is weaker when other indicators of government performance are 
perceived as more positive, whereas the effect of a fulfilled election pledge on voter 
evaluations of a political actor’s performance is weaker when other indicators of 
government performance are perceived as more negative. 
Further nuance of the notion that voters perceive broken pledges to constitute 
poor performance and fulfilled pledges to constitute to good performance is sought 
in the proposed policy action contained in pledges. It is theorised that if voters do 
not support this proposed policy action, they will be less inclined to administer re-
wards for its fulfilment. Vice versa, it can be expected that punishment is moderated 
by the consistency of the pledged policy action with a voter’s preferences. This 




H5: A broken election pledge is more likely to negatively affect a voter’s evaluation 
of a political actor’s performance if the proposed policy action in the pledge corre-
sponds to that voter’s preferences, whereas a fulfilled election pledge is more likely 
to positively affect a voter’s evaluation of a political actor’s performance if the 
proposed policy action in the pledge does not correspond to that voter’s preferences 
Departing from the notion that circumstantial factors are likely to impact voter 
expectations of pledge performance – and therewith the effects of pledge perfor-
mance on voter evaluations of government performance – insights from the expecta-
tion confirmation theory are borrowed to theorise that punishment and reward for 
pledge performance is contingent upon voters’ fulfilment expectations. The accom-
panying expectation disconfirmation hypothesis of outperformance and underper-
formance is tested in paper 2, and formulated as follows:  
H6: A broken election pledge is more likely to negatively affect a voter’s evalua-
tion of a political actor’s performance if the voter’s fulfilment expectations of this 
pledge were higher, whereas a fulfilled election pledge is more likely to positively 
affect a voter’s evaluation of a political actor’s performance if the voter’s fulfilment 
expectations of this pledge were lower. 
Building upon the work on negativity bias and retrospective voting addressing 
asymmetry in accountability processes, it was theorised that voters are more affected 
by broken pledges than by fulfilled pledges. This negativity bias hypothesis is em-
pirically addressed in paper 1 and formulated as follows: 
H7: The negative effect of a broken election pledge on a voter’s evaluation of a 
political actor’s performance is greater in magnitude than the positive effect of a 
fulfilled pledge on a voter’s evaluation of that political actor’s performance.







The formulated hypotheses are primarily tested through survey experiments – a 
common method for political science studies aiming to make causal claims about 
topics pertaining to political psychology, political behaviour, and public opinion (see 
e.g., Mullinix et al, 2016). The most important benefits of using survey experiments 
for this thesis are the possibility to isolate the effects of a particular intervention on 
voter evaluations and the ability to control for the direction of the measured effects. 
By eliminating the risk of confounding variables and/or reversed causality affecting 
the causal relations between the key variables of this study – survey experiments 
make correct empirical inferences more probable.  
Four experiments were used to test the hypotheses set out in papers 1-3 and were 
fielded in Spring 2015; Fall 2016 (replication); Winter 2017; and Spring 2019. The 
respondent samples used for the experiments varied in terms of size (2,000-13,000) 
and composition for different experiments. Part of the samples came from popula-
tion-based recruitment, but self-recruited respondents were also part of the samples. 
In each experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to treatment conditions, 
with pre-stratification on key demographic variables where applicable (experiments 
for papers 1 and 2). All four experiments were implemented by the Laboratory of 
Opinion Research (LORE)9 in their Citizen Panel. LORE is an organisation within 
the University of Gothenburg devoted to conducting data collection through web 
questionnaires. Collection of data in collaboration with LORE is performed through 
a number of web panels, of which the Citizen Panel is the largest with over 60,000 
active respondents in Sweden. The panel component of the Citizen Panel and their 
accommodation of survey experiments provided a very suitable environment to test 
most of the hypotheses developed in this dissertation. Measures from previous panel 
waves were used to allow for prior vote choice, party preferences, and political in-
terest to be incorporated into the statistical analyses. 
The experimental results are further supported by data obtained from original 
survey items fielded in national SOM surveys in Sweden, using population-based 
samples. The results were used as important input for the development of the theo-
retical model, empirical evidence for paper 3, and corroboration of the external 
validity of the experimental results. The survey questions were fielded in the nation-
al SOM surveys of 2016 and 2017, with sample sizes of 1,580 and 1,755, respective-
                                                                




ly. The Society, Opinion, and Media (SOM) Institute10 has conducted surveys to 
collect research data and presented annual trend analyses on public opinion and 
media habits in Sweden since 1986. Every year, the SOM Institute conducts a num-
ber of independent studies – nationally, regionally and locally, for which more than 
30 000 people living in Sweden, between the ages 16 to 85 years, are randomly 
selected to participate in the SOM surveys. 
In addition, for paper 4, data gathered in two large international surveys were 
analysed. Both of these were standard Eurobarometer surveys commissioned by the 
European Commission and fielded in 2009 (71.1) and 2019 (91.5). These Euroba-
rometer surveys were chosen for a number of reasons specific to paper 4, including 
the high quality of the data, the wide range of included indicators, and importantly, 
the inclusion of a party choice variable. For the dissertation as a whole, the method-
ology of paper 4 offers an added international perspective. Eurobarometer surveys 
are fielded in a large number of countries – and for all of these countries sizable 
samples of respondents are available. Moreover, together with the analyses of SOM 
data presented earlier in this chapter, the analyses of the likewise cross-sectional 
Eurobarometer data provide a non-experimental context for the primary experi-
mental results presented in this dissertation. 
One important consideration for all experiments has been the trade-off between 
the internal and external validity of the experimental results. Confronting respond-
ents with real-world pledges and accurate information about their fulfilment status, 
as well as the pledge-maker, can be expected to render more reliable responses than 
presenting them with information about fictive parties and pledges. At the same 
time, since accurate real-world information cannot be adjusted to fit a treatment 
condition, this gain in external validity comes at a cost to internal validity. Indeed, 
the same pledge cannot be both fulfilled and broken, and the same government party 
cannot both break and fulfil the majority of its pledges. Therefore, in the experi-
ments in which accurate real-world information was used (for papers 1 and 2), ef-
forts had to be made to mitigate the looming loss of internal validity by selecting 
highly comparable (groups of) pledges and performance information for the differ-
ent treatment and control groups. For the discrete choice experiment designed for 
paper 3, it was not possible to use real-world information. Indeed, for this type of 
experiment to function the same attributes have to be assigned different values for 
different respondents. The inevitable hit to external validity this results in limits the 
degree to which the acquired knowledge can be applied to understanding real-world 
accountability processes. For those processes, many factors pertaining to the politi-
cal context, voter and government party identity, and performance are likely to af-
fect voter perceptions and decisions. However, for evaluating political behaviour 
and psychology outside of a national setting, and with a lesser burden of contextual 
factors, this type of experiment offers great advantages (Hainmueller et al, 2015).  
All four experiments were conducted in Sweden, and for all but the discrete 
choice experiment information about Swedish parties, pledges, and performances 
was used. It is hard to estimate how this affects the generalisability of the results 
                                                                
10 See https://som.gu.se for more information. 
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found in this thesis. However, theories of democratic accountability and retrospec-
tive voting tend to be viewed as universal theories, and comparative empirical stud-
ies on these topics do not typically reveal large regional differences (e.g., Lohmann 
et al, 1997; Wilkin et al, 1997; Jhee, 2006; Healy et al, 2017; see for overviews 
Berry and Howell, 2007; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). For the kind of psychological 
processes concerned here, in general, it is difficult to imagine that voters living in 
comparable conditions would respond fundamentally differently to the same treat-
ments. The perception that politicians do not even try to keep their pledges, for ex-
ample, also seems quite consistent across countries (ISSP, 2006). For the individual 
papers, subgroup analyses also did not support the notion that certain groups of 
respondents, who could potentially be more or less prevalent in other countries, 
responded in a considerably different way to the experimental treatments. The sepa-
rate papers (1-3) provide detailed descriptions of the design and analytical strategy 
of the experiments.   






Papers in summary 
Four papers constitute this dissertation. The first paper addresses the overarching 
hypothesis that information about broken and fulfilled election pledges should lead 
voters to punish and reward their government, respectively (H1). More specifically, 
it also addresses the negativity bias (H7), the pledge content hypothesis (H5), and 
the partisanship hypotheses (H3). The second paper focuses on the effects of pledge 
context on the assessment of pledge performance – testing the ECT hypotheses (H6) 
of outperformance and underperformance. The hypothesis addressed in the third 
paper is the relative importance hypothesis (H4); evaluating the importance of 
pledge performance to voters under the conditionality of other important modes of 
government performance. The final paper addresses the partisanship hypotheses 
(H2; H3); exploring the extent to which partisan cheerleading occurs in political 
surveys and to what degree this is dependent on the distance from the national, parti-
san politics of the survey question. 
  
Paper 1: ‘Asymmetric Accountability: An Experimental Investigation of Bias-
es in Evaluations of Governments’ Election Pledges’ (with Elin Naurin and 
Stuart Soroka) 
 
The first paper is co-authored with Elin Naurin and Stuart Soroka. In this paper, the 
notion that – in a similar fashion to all retrospective voting – voters should adminis-
ter electoral rewards to government parties that fulfil their pledges and punish those 
that break their pledges was put to an empirical test. Following accounts of negativi-
ty bias, it was further hypothesised that voters should attach more weight to broken 
than to fulfilled pledges, and hence that punishment should be observed more prom-
inently than reward. Finally, it was theorised that the relationship of the voter to the 
pledge content, and the pledge maker, should provide at least a partial explanation as 
to why certain voters may reward parties for good pledge performance and others 
may not.  
Two large-scale survey experiments were implemented in the Citizen Panel of 
LORE. Both the original experiment and the replication experiment designed for 
paper 1 contribute in three important ways to gathering the necessary empirical 
evidence to answer the questions posed in this thesis and to test its hypotheses. The 
experiment provided an important empirical test of the overarching reward-
punishment hypothesis (H1) for pledge performance (i). In addition, the conditional-
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ity of this main effect was tested in two important ways. By comparing the effects of 
broken and fulfilled pledges on voters, the negativity bias hypothesis (H7) was put 
to an empirical test (ii). Finally, by accounting for the consistency of the policy 
action contained in the presented pledges with the respondents’ policy preferences 
and partisan identity, the pledge content hypothesis (H5) was also subjected to an 
empirical test (iii). 
The original experiment, implemented in the spring of 2015, divided 13,000 re-
spondents over ten treatment groups (approximately 1,000 respondents per group) 
and one control group (approximately 3,000 respondents). Five of the ten treatment 
groups all received one fulfilled pledge made by the Social Democrats prior to the 
2014 parliamentary election in Sweden – a different pledge for each group. The 
other five treatment groups were presented with one broken pledge made by the 
Social Democrats prior to the 2014 parliamentary election in Sweden – again a dif-
ferent pledge for each group. The control group received a null treatment carefully 
matching the actionable language of the treatments administered to the other ten 
groups, only omitting all pledge-related information. To account for the varying 
saliency and policy area in which pledges were made, ten different pledges were 
used for the treatments – paired up to represent the same policy areas across treat-
ment conditions. Respondents were not explicitly told that the pledge they had re-
ceived was broken or fulfilled, but rather they were asked: ‘Are you aware that the 
Social Democrats will break/have fulfilled this promise?’. The control group was 
asked: ‘Do you know that the Social Democrats have been in government since the 
election of 2014?’. These questions were not asked for the purpose of analysis of its 
responses, but rather to reinforce the treatment information for the respondent. Both 
response possibilities (dichotomous) repeated the same information again, so that 
respondents could read the vital and distinctive parts of the treatment information no 
less than three times. Immediately after the treatment, all respondents were asked to 
answer the following dependent variable question on a seven point scale: ‘How well 
do you think that the Social Democrats have performed in government?’. 
The replication experiment, fielded in the fall of 2016, had almost entirely the 
same design. The main differences were that it utilised slightly fewer respondents 
(approximately 10,000), had eight instead of ten treatment groups (approximately 
1,000 respondents per treatment group), and included a measure to account for re-
spondents’ policy preferences prior to the experimental treatment. The findings were 
in a sense remarkable, but at the same time in line with expectations. Pledge-based 
accountability was indeed found to be asymmetrical – with voters administering 
clear punishments for broken pledges and much weaker rewards, if any, for fulfilled 
pledges. Thus, partial support was provided for the reward-punishment hypothesis 
(H1) and strong support for the negativity bias hypothesis (H7). It was also found 
that voters with lesser affinity with the pledge content or maker (i.e., for whom the 
pledge was not policy or partisan consistent) may even punish a government party 
for fulfilling a pledge. Thus, the findings supported the pledge content hypothesis 
(H5) more than the partisanship hypothesis (H3). If parties are punished for poor 
performance, and by some even for supposedly good performance, then the net re-
sult is a loss of support almost irrespective of how well they perform. This leads to 
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the conclusion that asymmetrical accountability processes may well provide an im-
portant, partial explanation for the ‘cost of ruling’, the seemingly inevitable tenden-
cy for governments to lose approval over their tenure in office. 
 
Paper 2: ‘Not as expected: The role of performance expectations in voter 
responses to election pledge fulfilment’ 
 
For paper 2, a survey experiment was designed that first aimed to raise and lower 
respondents’ expectations of pledge fulfilment and thereafter to confirm or discon-
firm these expectations with information about fulfilled or broken pledges. It ex-
plores the notion that not only the content, but also the context of election pledges 
should matter for how voters deal with political parties fulfilling and breaking them. 
It studies the influence of contextual factors surrounding election pledges on voter 
responses to pledge performance. Borrowing insights on the expectation confirma-
tion theory (ECT) from other disciplines, such as psychology, marketing, and public 
administration studies, it is hypothesised that voters with lower expectations would 
be more rewarding when pledges are fulfilled, and that voters with higher expecta-
tions would punish pledge-breaking parties more severely. The experiment designed 
for this paper, thus, aimed to test the ECT hypotheses of outperformance and under-
performance (H6). 
The experiment designed to test these hypotheses empirically is an innovative 
large-scale survey experiment, in which the respondents' expectations of pledge 
fulfilment were first raised and lowered prior to them receiving information about 
real-world broken and fulfilled pledges. First, for all respondents (2,465 in total), a 
pre-measure of the focal dependent variable (evaluation of the Social Democrats’ 
performance in government) was recorded through a survey question that separately 
measured the respondents’ opinion about the performance of both current govern-
ment parties (Social Democrats and Green Party) and the current opposition parties 
(Alliance parties; Sweden Democrats; Left Party). Then, 40% of the respondents 
(groups 1 & 2; 988 respondents) received a treatment text intended to raise their 
pledge fulfilment expectations – telling them that research has shown that Social 
Democrat governments keep most of their promises (which is true, see Naurin, 
2011). Another 40% (groups 3 & 4; 967 respondents) received a treatment text in-
tended to lower their fulfilment expectations – telling them that research has shown 
that minority coalition governments, which the Social Democrats were at the time a 
part of, usually find it more difficult to uphold their promises (which is also true, see 
Thomson et al, 2017). The remaining 20%, in the control group, received a null 
treatment text utilising the same key words. Immediately after these expectation 
treatments, as a manipulation check, all respondents were asked to state their expec-
tations regarding the Social Democrats’ fulfilment of election pledges for this gov-
erning term. In the third step, 40% of the respondents (groups 1 & 3) received a 
treatment text confronting the respondents with pledge fulfilment by the Social 
Democrats, including three examples of fulfilled pledges. The other 40% (groups 2 
& 4) received a treatment text confronting the respondents with the Social Demo-
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crats’ breaking of election pledges, including three examples. The remaining 20%, 
in the control group, received a null treatment text containing the same key words 
but merely mentioning that the Social Democrats make election pledges and three 
examples – with no mention of their fulfilment status (which was still undecided for 
these pledges at the time of the survey). Now, for group 1, the raised fulfilment 
expectations should have been positively confirmed; for group 2, the raised fulfil-
ment expectations should have been negatively disconfirmed; for group 3, the low-
ered fulfilment expectations should have been positively disconfirmed, and for 
group 4, the lowered fulfilment expectations should have been negatively confirmed. 
Subsequently, all groups were again asked for their evaluation of the Social Demo-
crats’ performance in government so that confirmation and disconfirmation effects 
could be recorded and the ECT hypotheses of underperformance and outperfor-
mance tested. The design of this experiment was pre-registered with EGAP. 
In the experiment, it proved possible to considerably raise and lower respond-
ents' performance expectations, and these expectations were found to matter a great 
deal to how voters use pledge performance to hold their government accountable. 
No support for the outperformance and underperformance hypothesis (H6) was 
found. Interestingly, findings from interacting the manipulated performance expecta-
tions and pledge performance information support the presence of a confirmation, 
rather than a disconfirmation, bias. In line with some other studies that have applied 
the expectation disconfirmation theory to political processes (most prominently 
Seyd, 2015), this study finds that attitudes about pledge performance are formed 
more similarly to other political attitudes than evaluations of private/public goods or 
services. The found confirmation bias in combination with a negativity bias in the 
media, provides a partial explanation of the low esteem voters hold of election 
pledge fulfilment in general, which is well-documented (see ISSP, 2006). 
 
Paper 3: ‘The policy-seeking voter: Evaluations of government performance 
beyond the economy’ 
 
In paper 3, the relative importance of pledge performance to evaluations of govern-
ment performance and party choice are examined in comparison to commonly used 
criteria of government performance. Theoretical insights and analysis of survey data 
on representational preferences are used to construct the argument that while pledge 
performance matters to voters, it does not matter to all voters equally and is condi-
tional upon other indicators of government performance. The discrete-choice exper-
iment designed addresses voter perceptions of pledge fulfilment as good perfor-
mance and broken pledges as poor performance; and the relative importance of 
pledge performance versus other important indicators of government performance 
(H4). The aim of the experiment was to elicit an estimate of the relative importance 
of pledge performance through conjoint analysis of varying discrete-choice tasks 
that the respondents were confronted with. The basic arrangement was that respond-
ents were asked to choose between two fictional, unlabelled political parties, based 
on a set of five attributes with randomly assigned values. Each of these five attrib-
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utes could take on three values – positive, neutral, or negative. In total, 243 unique 
party profiles were available. As it would be unfeasible to have all possible pairs of 
profiles assessed by at least one respondent, a fractional factorial design was elected 
(see Hainmueller et al, 2014). 
To avoid primacy and ordering effects, the order of the attributes was random-
ised per respondent. Before the experiment commenced, the respondents were 
shown a screen with a short introduction to the experiment telling them about the 
study, what sort of task to expect, and what they should do. On the next screen, 
respondents were then shown two competing profiles (Party A and Party B) contain-
ing randomly-assigned values for these five attributes, per screen. They were then 
shown three questions that formed the dependent variables of this study. First, the 
respondents were asked which of these two parties they would choose if they had to 
vote for either. Then, they were asked to evaluate each party’s time in office, based 
on the descriptions provided, on a scale ranging from very bad (1) to very good (7). 
On the final screen, after the experiment was concluded, the respondents were asked 
how important they found each separate attribute. All five attributes were simultane-
ously regressed on the dependent variables (see Hainmueller, 2014). For the discrete 
choice data, the dependent variable is the estimated probability of choosing a party 
profile (0-1). For the ranking data, the dependent variable is the average rating of a 
party profile by the respondents (1-7). To avoid problems with degrees of freedom 
in the final models, the respondents were asked to complete only one task each – 
eliminating the need to cluster the standard errors at the respondent level, and there-
with associated concerns over degrees of freedom (see Franchino and Zucchini, 
2015). Attribute orthogonality is achieved by design in this study. The design of this 
experiment was pre-registered with EGAP.  
The findings indicate that voters are policy-seekers, to whom policy output mat-
ters even beyond policy outcomes; but also that voters are egotropic in their evalua-
tion of implemented policy and attach more weight to implemented policy corre-
sponding to their personal preferences than to majority preferences in public opin-
ion, and election pledges. Thus, strong support was provided for the relative im-
portance hypothesis (H4). 
 
Paper 4: ‘Partisan cheerleading outside a partisan context: Biased respons-
es to political survey questions’ 
 
Paper 4 addresses the influence of partisan cheerleading and the government-
opposition divide among survey respondents on responses to commonly used survey 
questions (H2). It argues that survey respondents engage in partisan ‘cheerleading’ 
even when responding to survey questions that have little to no connection with 
national, partisan politics. One observation made about these survey questions is that 
even when they are formulated without explicit party references, such as labels or 
operative words, respondents seem to understand the question as a reflection on the 
incumbent government’s performance. This, in turn, leads respondents to tap into 
their partisan preferences and answer more positively if their preferred party is part 
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of the government and more negatively if their preferred party is not part of the 
government.  
The data used for this study were obtained from two standard Eurobarometer 
surveys commissioned by the European Commission in 2009 and 2019. 171 ques-
tions were deemed suitable for analysis and coded based on their formulation into 
three categories. The first category is that of formulations containing no explicit 
party references, with a national topic. The second category is that of formulations 
containing no explicit party references, on an international topic. Finally, the third 
category is that of formulations containing explicit non-party references. This means 
that the formulation, for example, explicitly mentioned an international institution, 
such as the European Central Bank or the United Nations. Summated rating scales 
were constructed for these three categories, and respondents were coded into sup-
porters of the largest government party and largest opposition party in all included 
countries to analyse whether partisans provide significantly different answers to 
these survey questions. The analyses make clear that they do. Even to questions far 
away from national, partisan politics, such partisans provide partisan responses, with 
government supporters providing more positive responses to virtually all survey 
questions and opposition supporters providing more negative responses. These re-
sults were validated through a series of robustness checks. Strong support is provid-
ed for the partisanship hypothesis (H2). 






Findings and implications 
The empirical studies find overwhelming support for the notion that the overarching 
reward-punishment hypothesis formulated for this dissertation is too simplistic to 
fully inform understanding of pledge-based accountability. At the same time, the 
results do not support either a completely cynical view of the degree to which voters 
consider policy pledges and decisions when evaluating governments. Papers 1 and 4 
jointly disavow the notion that partisanship may hold an undue influence over 
pledge-based accountability processes. Moreover, all experiments conducted for 
papers 1-3 provide strong evidence of rewards and punishments for fulfilled and 
broken election pledges, observed in voters’ evaluations of government perfor-
mance.  
There are important nuances to note, though. Paper 1 also provides strong sup-
port for the negativity bias hypothesis (H7), revealing that voters hold governments 
to account for broken pledges – which can result in considerable punishment – but 
may not reward them for fulfilled pledges. The paper also provides support for the 
pledge content hypothesis (H5), showing that the fulfilment of unwanted pledges 
can cause severe punishment for governments. While not supporting the expectation 
disconfirmation hypothesis (H6), paper 2 still finds strong support for the notion 
that voters’ expectations of pledge fulfilment interfere with the rewards and punish-
ments they allot for fulfilled and broken pledges. When pledge performance is in 
line with voters’ expectations, they provide considerably stronger punishments for 
broken pledges or considerably stronger rewards for fulfilled pledges, respectively. 
Paper 3, then, provides strong evidence that voters find policy output important 
when evaluating governments, even more so than (economic) outcomes, but also 
makes clear that the content of the implemented policies is considered much more 
important than the fact that the implementation of such a policy fulfils an election 
pledge. 
In summation, the empirical findings show that in evaluating their governments 
voters find pledge performance important, but less so than policy congruence. The 
most important implication of this is that voters do not regard pledge fulfilment as 
an important procedural value. While voters punish incumbents for breaking their 
pledges, they do not administer rewards for pledge fulfilment on its own - especially 
not if the content of the fulfilled pledges does not correspond to the voters’ prefer-
ences. Indeed, the findings suggest that voters are more policy-seeking than often 
presumed and that the procedures through which these preferred policies are ob-
tained is of secondary importance to voters. Whether the implemented policy corre-
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sponds to public opinion and election pledges appears to matter little beyond indi-
vidual policy satisfaction.  
Since voters attach more weight to broken than to fulfilled election pledges, and 
any further positive effects of pledge fulfilment are hindered by the degree to which 
the policy action contained in a pledge corresponds to a voter’s preferences, pledge-
based accountability is asymmetrical. This means that political parties may suffer a 
decrease in voter approval even when they fulfil their pledges. This provides an 
important account of the ‘cost of ruling’ – the widely-observed tendency of govern-
ments to suffer decreasing approval over the course of their governmental tenure.  
Not only the content, but also the context of election pledges was found to affect 
pledge-based accountability processes. Contextual factors can affect voter expecta-
tions of pledge fulfilment, and these fulfilment expectations can be assigned an 
important role in how voters respond to broken and fulfilled pledges. However, the 
observed influence of fulfilment expectations does not correspond to the expectation 
disconfirmation hypotheses of outperformance and underperformance. Instead, a 
confirmation bias appears to impact how voters respond to pledge performance – 
meaning that fulfilled pledges have a stronger positive effect on high expectation 
voters and broken pledges have a stronger negative effect on low expectation voters. 
This means that if parties want to gain voter approval, they should aim for better 
performance rather than lowering voter expectations. Placed back into context, the 
findings imply that attitudes about pledge performance are formed in a similar way 
to other political attitudes. This notion combined with the presence of negativity 
biases in both voters and media may provide an interesting partial explanation of the 
low esteem in which voters generally hold pledge fulfilment. 
In conjunction, these preliminary findings warrant the conclusion that the reality 
of pledge-based accountability, despite its apparent straightforwardness, is indeed 
considerably more complex than could be inferred from the overarching reward-
punishment hypothesis or from a perspective of cynicism. Broken and fulfilled 
pledges do matter to voters, and voters may be more policy-seeking than often pre-
sumed, but that does not mean that all voters reward every fulfilled or punish every 
broken pledge. Biases affect this process, sometimes in expected ways such as 
through negativity bias; sometimes in unexpected ways, through, for example, con-
firmation bias; and sometimes less so than anticipated, as through partisan bias. The 
main take away for accountability processes in general, other than that they can be 
expected to be complex, is that voters appear to want to get their way (see also 
Esaiasson et al, 2016). They want to obtain the policy that they prefer (e.g., Elinder 
et al, 2015), and they respond to confirmation of their political expectations (Knob-
loch-Westerwick, 2015). Indeed, this fits into a wider global trend of perceived 
digital echo chambers and their very real political consequences (see e.g., Brugnoli 
et al, 2019). In combination with the negativity bias found in this dissertation, as 
well as in many other parts of political life and the media (see Soroka, 2014), this 
may have led and continue to lead to political cynicism among voters. Indeed, if 
voters respond strongest to information that is in line with their expectations, as well 
as to negative information such as the media might overly supply, then accountabil-
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ity processes may very well not function in the way that society needs them to in 
turbulent times as these. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
  
The aim of this dissertation was to clarify how election pledges matter to voters’ 
retrospective evaluation of government performance. Evaluations of government 
performance were used as a precursor to retrospective vote choice in this study of 
accountability processes. A logical next step would be to investigate in a real-world 
setting to what extent policy output influences re-election decisions in individual 
voters. While the impacts on evaluations of government performance and simulated 
party choice were substantial, the degree to which such evaluations are taken to the 
ballot box may vary, and in a full model of vote choice the impacts could be sub-
stantially weaker. 
It could already be an interesting addition to replicate the results obtained in the 
discrete choice experiment designed for paper 3, using more realistic and less de-
scriptive scenarios. Similarly, it would be interesting to study the themes of this 
dissertation in a more comparative setting, for example how pledge performance is 
evaluated for different types of governments. Finally, a considerable contribution to 
the understanding of partisan cheerleading could be made if the analysis used in 
paper 4 were to be implemented in a comparable, but non-political survey. If indeed 
it is the political nature of a survey that persuades partisan respondents to provide 
partisan responses (see Bullock and Lenz, 2019) to virtually all questions, such a 
finding could have important repercussions for the analysis of political surveys eve-
rywhere. 
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